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Abstract
This article analyses the development effects of a foreign-owned almond farm in Morocco from the 
perspective of its role in affecting the dualism present in the Moroccan agricultural sector. The farm was 
situated on lands owned by the State, leased under the framework of the Green Morocco Plan and aimed 
at developing the country’s agriculture. The Spanish-owned farm matches the criteria of agricultural 
production that Moroccan authorities hoped to expand according to this plan. Therefore, it is used here as 
an example to understand and reflect on how the Green Morocco Plan has been confronting the dualistic 
nature of the Moroccan agricultural sector. 
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1. Introduction1
Morocco adopted its first Structural Adjust-
ment Plan in 1983 and began a process of eco-
nomic transformation based on liberalization, a 
greater role for the private sector, and integra-
tion into the world economy. During the 1990s, 
the country attracted 40% to 50% of all invest-
ment inflows to the North Africa region, obtain-
ing significant support from foreign investors 
for its adjustment policies. During the 2000s, 
Morocco issued several sector-specific plans 
aimed at boosting economic growth, increasing 
competitiveness and exports, and diversifying 
economic activities. These strategies covered 
key sectors including tourism, industry, and 
1 This research was conducted in the framework of a research project on foreign direct investment and deve-
lopment financed by the Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation (AECID). The project code 
is 11-CAP2-1066.
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agriculture, and all sought to attract foreign in-
vestment as a means to achieve economic goals. 
Despite this, according to the UNDP (2016), 
Morocco continues to exhibit persistent poverty 
and acute inequality, even by Arab region stand-
ards. These problems affect mainly rural areas, 
while the benefits of economic modernization 
have concentrated into urban Morocco. Accord-
ing to the Moroccan High Commission for Hu-
man Development, rural areas account for 70% 
of poverty in the country, and the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Fisheries states that more than 
80% of revenue in rural areas derives directly 
from agriculture. This sector accounts for 42% 
of national employment, but only 14% of nation-
al income.
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In this context, a strategy for agricultural de-
velopment known as the Green Morocco Plan 
(GMP) was advanced by the Agency for Agri-
cultural Development under the umbrella of the 
Moroccan Ministry of Agriculture and Fisher-
ies. The Green Morocco Plan acknowledges the 
problem of duality in the country’s agricultural 
sector, yet it encourages bipolar development 
of that sector by way of two sets of measures 
(or pillars) and therefore may be working at 
cross-purposes. Pillar I of the GMP aims at de-
veloping high-performance agriculture, adapted 
to international market competition by means of 
stimuli to private investment. Pillar II consists 
of combating poverty via the promotion of sol-
idarity projects meant to increase the income of 
the most vulnerable farmers, particularly in sen-
sitive areas.
This leads to a first (general and academic) 
question of how to combat dualism in develop-
ing countries with extensive and underproduc-
tive agricultural sectors. More specifically, we 
wonder whether measures adopted under the 
GMP in order to combat dualistic development 
(evident in Morocco) are aligned with the spe-
cific objectives on confronting dualism stated by 
the same plan. Through analysis of the features 
and performance of a specific almond farm, we 
intend to contribute to the literature on dualism 
and, more specifically, to the study of the GMP.
As explained in Sections 1 and 2 of this paper, 
GMP Pillar I might appear to be consistent with 
Arthur Lewis’ seminal works on dualism and de-
velopment, as it encourages the kind of vibrant 
capitalist sector that might progressively concen-
trate resources, reduce the size of the subsistence 
sector, and overcome persistent duality. How-
ever, through analysis of a specific agricultural 
investment matching the GMP criteria of high 
performance and international competitiveness in 
agriculture, this paper reveals that the logic un-
derlying the plan ignores much of what is known 
about development economics and dualistic 
economies, including Lewisian theory. In Section 
3, we make explicit our methods of analysis and 
address controversies around the use of single 
case studies with theoretical purposes. In Section 
4 we present the case study of the almond farm, 
and in the final section we offer our conclusions.
2. Dualism in academic literature
Dualism was first characterized by Lewis (1954) 
in a seminal piece that also became a milestone 
in the foundation of development economics as 
an academic discipline. From his point of view, 
economic structures in developing countries can 
be easily categorized into two distinctive groups: 
(i) a capitalist sector that is generally industrial, 
dynamic, labour-demanding, and comparatively 
productive; and (ii) a subsistence sector that is ag-
ricultural and/or artisanal, informal, and compar-
atively unproductive. Later, Kirkpatrick and Bar-
rientos (2004) and Gollin (2014) underlined that 
Lewis’ division was based on productivity gaps 
and labour differences, suggesting that this was 
not necessarily an industrial/agricultural divide.
According to Lewis, economic development 
will be triggered as a result of demand for labour 
by a vibrant capitalist sector; the required labour 
force will be transferred from subsistence to the 
capitalist sector (a process typical to rural exodus, 
if the capitalist sector is industrial). This will lead 
to economic growth and job creation in the indus-
trial sector, along with increased productivity in 
the subsistence sector (where similar economic 
activity can be easily achieved with a smaller la-
bour force). Total productivity increases will be 
registered in the overall economy (as the produc-
tive industrial sector grows within the economy, 
and as agriculture becomes more productive). 
In parallel to this approach to economic devel-
opment, the Latin American structuralist school 
has taken a fairly different view of the same phe-
nomenon. Structuralism likewise acknowledg-
es the structural differences within developing 
countries (for instance, between the agricultural 
and industrial sectors) (Prebisch, 1950). Howev-
er, from the structuralist point of view, this gap re-
sults from a similar gap at the international level, 
between rich and poor countries. The internal pro-
ductivity gap is partly the result of an outward-ori-
ented economy, where the capitalist sector (which 
shares features with Lewis’ description) is con-
nected to an international capitalist sector (mostly 
controlled by rich countries), while the subsist-
ence sector (which is disconnected and unproduc-
tive) lags behind. Moreover, unlike in Lewisian 
postulates, the possibility that the capitalist sector 
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may be the agricultural sector itself becomes a 
major characteristic (this being the case in most 
Latin American countries, and in the Moroccan 
economy), so that the gap characterizing a dual 
economy occurs within the rural sector (and not 
as industrial/urban versus agricultural/rural). As a 
result, according to the structuralist view on dual-
ism, the very nature of dualism inhibits the trig-
gering of a development process: the subsistence 
and capitalist sectors are not connected.
This disconnection can occur in different 
(non-exclusive) realms: the modern sector might 
have no productive linkages with other domes-
tic sectors (whether as providers or as buyers), 
which would prevent technological transfers via 
such linkages. Elsewhere, productive linkages 
might exist but not trigger technological trans-
fers. Moreover, due to its own low labour inten-
sity in economic activity, the capitalist sector 
itself might function as an enclave that demands 
no labour from the subsistence sector.
Lewis’ model has been criticized on several 
fronts (Hosseini, 2012), including on grounds 
that the author did not consider the possibility 
that earnings in the modern sector would be in-
vested abroad. Although the canonical version 
of Lewis’ model applies to closed economies, 
Lewis himself (1954) did foresee different im-
plications, in terms of dualism, in the event of 
the opening of an economy. In one such scenario, 
where a developing country exports basic goods 
and imports capital (via that same exporter), the 
formation of enclaves was deemed a very likely 
result. In this sense, there may be a kind of con-
sensus among development economists around 
the risk of persistent dualism in the form of such 
enclaves (units domestically isolated from the 
point of view of their productive linkages, tech-
nological transfers, or labour demand).
The Lewis model has been empirically tested 
in various developing contexts. For instance, ac-
cording to Bourguignon and Morrisson (1988), 
increasing rural productivity in developing coun-
tries has been a major element for decreasing in-
equality. In the case of Thailand, according to 
2 Several institutions have presented the main features of the plan on their web pages (see, for instance, www.
ada.gov.ma/StrateguePM.php). These institutions refer to the GMP when presenting specific policy actions, such as 
tenders, grants, infrastructures, etc. 
Jitsuchon (2014), rural-to-urban migration does 
not fit into Lewis’ model. In Mexico, Hernández 
Laos and Velázquez Roa (2003) find evidence 
of persistent and even worsening dualism in the 
context of globalization. In this case, the tradi-
tional sector is comprised by agricultural activ-
ities as well as construction, while the modern 
sector is composed of mining (oil extraction), 
manufactures, power distribution, and financial 
services. Laterza (2016) also finds evidence of 
Lewis-type dualism in the Swazi economy and 
adds a racial divide to the set of capitalist-sub-
sistence gaps: white employees tend to nurture 
the capitalist sector, while the subsistence sector 
is more intensive in black workers.
Barbier and Bugas (2014) add an additional 
problem to the phenomenon of dualistic rural 
economies in Latin American. In that region, the 
risk of Dutch disease associated with commod-
ities booms leads to increased productivity in 
rural sectors (merely as a result of increased sale 
prices, with no associated innovations), and this 
hinders a process of structural transformation.
Despite the flaws highlighted above, the dual-
istic postulate for open economies seems a suit-
able approach for analysing the transformations 
occurring in the Moroccan rural sector, given 
that sector’s high contribution to GDP and its 
abundant workforce, low productivity, and co-
existence with a modern capitalist sector.
3. The Green Morocco Plan
Faysee (2015:2) considers the Green Moroc-
co Plan2 to be a «strong come-back of the state 
via both an ambitious strategy and increased re-
sources». From the time of national independ-
ence to the 1980s, the state was actively involved 
in agricultural development, not only through 
provision of infrastructures but by promotion of 
agricultural production in specific sectors and 
regions, often by means of state-owned farms. 
During the 1980s, structural adjustment policies 
led the Moroccan government to dismantle those 
structures and allow private actors to enter the 
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sector through tenders. At that time, trade liber-
alization (framed under the Euro-Mediterranean 
Association) was seen as an opportunity for at-
tracting investments oriented to EU markets. 
For this reason, the GMP was issued in 2008 
with the aim of re-shaping the Moroccan agricul-
tural supply, and an increase in public resources 
toward that purpose was also announced; this 
was regarded as a return to state-fostered pro-
ductive activities. However, as Faysee remarks, 
while public intervention during the 20th cen-
tury was instituted from the top down, the new 
tools inherent in the GMP are meant to support 
bottom-up activities.
Faysee (2015) further points out the proprie-
ty of the GMP to a dual agricultural structure: it 
aims to create agricultural enterprises in both fa-
vourable and unfavourable areas, to achieve the 
professionalization of small and medium farms. 
It also focuses on agricultural value chains and 
their coordination, and it aims to identify stake-
holders with the capacity to lead, and especially 
to support small-scale farms.
Arguing to the contrary, Akesby (2012) and 
Mahdi (2014) consider the GMP to be a plan 
that reinforces the dualistic nature of Morocco’s 
agricultural sector through its focus on modern 
agriculture for a few and its bias toward large-
sized farms, which could destabilize family-run 
agriculture.
In either case, the GMP acknowledges the 
dualistic features of Morocco’s rural sector as it 
links the challenges of the agricultural sector to 
modernization of the dominant subsistence sec-
tor (Table 1).
Regarding the provision of agricultural goods, 
this plan illustrates the country’s concerns about 
the instability of a sector highly affected by rain-
fall. Agricultural production in Morocco repre-
sents 14% of GDP, which is a very high rate even 
compared to other North African countries. Vari-
ations in crops have a significant impact on over-
all economic growth in Morocco, and this has a 
relevant social effect via rises in food prizes.
Another social implication of agricultural ac-
tivities, according to the GMP, is their importance 
in terms of employment. As mentioned above, 
agriculture accounts for 42% of employment in 
the country, and families living beneath the pov-
erty line obtain 82% of their revenue from the 
sector. Therefore, the GMP sets another goal con-
sisting in the stabilization and increase of income 
obtained by farmers, as a means to tackle poverty, 
especially in central areas of the country. In this 
sense, the plan is targeting one of the symptoms 
of a dual economy: comparatively low wages and 
earnings in the traditional subsistence sector.
Despite the share of the agricultural sector 
in Morocco’s production and employment, the 
GMP also takes into account that the agricul-
Table 1 - Challenges for agricultural development according to the GMP.
The two sectors - Only 18% of farmers have access to bank loans.
- 70% of farms are smaller than 5 hectares.
Revenue - The income of 80% of the rural population (14 million) depends on agriculture.
-  Due to land fragmentation and the predominance of cereals, the income of the rural 
population remains low.
Productivity -  Agro-food carries a negative trade balance (-2,000 million Dirham, excluding 
fishing).
-  Unstable production, due to seasonality and climatology, with an estimated impact  
of 14% of GDP.
Employment and 
resource allocation
- Low investment. Mechanization in Morocco is 11 times lower than in Spain.
-  Significant impact of seasonality in employment (agriculture accounts for 42% of 
total employment).
- 80% to 90% of water is directed to agricultural uses. Inefficient irrigation systems.
-  75% of land is allocated to cereal production, with only 10% to 15% turnover and 
5% to 10% employment within the agricultural sector.
Source: Own elaboration, based on Green Morocco Plan. Data available at www.ada.gov.ma.
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tural trade balance of the country is negative, 
highlighting the need for increased productivity 
(another element of the dual model). The sector 
needs to be further modernized with regard to 
its use of water, being currently responsible for 
80% of national water consumption but nonethe-
less failing to ensure stable production.
Furthermore, documents derived from the 
GMP compare Morocco with Spain and note 
that, while the European country adds 100% of 
value to its agro-food products through indus-
trial transformation, Morocco’s industrial added 
value to food products reaches only 33%. The 
plan finds this difference illustrative of one way 
to foster structural change (away from the agri-
cultural sector) in the Moroccan economy.
As highlighted by Faysee (2012), the GMP 
links this sort of low performance to a dual farm-
ing structure, with traditional farms representing 
the vast majority and with only a few modern ag-
ricultural enterprises. The rationale of the GMP is 
to escape the dual structure of the sector by pro-
viding tailored support to both kinds of farms.
In order to do so, the GMP differentiates two 
implementation strategies (“pillars”) depending 
on the type of farmers involved. The first pillar 
involves modern companies, and its objective 
is the creation of internationally competitive 
agricultural “poles”. The second pillar involves 
smallholder agriculture, and its goal is to improve 
livelihoods and to eradicate poverty in rural areas.
As per the Agency for Agricultural Develop-
ment (Agence pour le Développement Agricole, 
or ADA), Pillar I therefore relies on an increase 
of private investment, both domestic and for-
eign. By means of international tenders, private 
investors commit to implementing agricultural 
and/or agro-industrial projects. Then, following 
an assessment of economic viability and techni-
cal adaptation to the agricultural potential of the 
area, the ADA offers investors long-term tenan-
cy on state-owned lands at a reduced price.
The ADA has two additional tools for putting 
Pillar I in place: contract programs and aggrega-
tion projects. A contract program is a series of 
actions to improve the organization, production, 
3 Spain is often used as the benchmark for Moroccan agriculture in official presentations of the GMP, not only 
for its proximity, but also because of its comparatively high performance in similar physical contexts. Nevertheless, 
and productivity of a value chain over a period of 
7 to 10 years. Each contract defines the respon-
sibilities of the actors in the chain (and those of 
the state) in carrying out the planned actions. An 
aggregation project is where an actor from an 
agricultural value chain that is deemed to hold a 
leading competitive position takes responsibility 
for supporting the production of a group of farm-
ers, and for purchasing their products.
All three of the actions under Pillar I concen-
trate on areas identified as “agro-poles” (the po-
tential capitalist sector, following Lewis’ defini-
tion). They meet certain natural conditions and 
benefit from public infrastructure investments, 
mainly in terms of irrigation.
Therefore, it could be said that the first two 
tools (international tenders and contract pro-
grams) are meant to create or nurture the capital-
ist sector (again, in Lewis’ terms), while the third 
tool (aggregation projects) is aimed at favouring 
a spill-over of gains in the capitalist sector to the 
subsistence sector, so that Lewis’ virtuous circle 
of dualism and development is triggered.
Pillar II projects, on the other hand, are mainly 
grants paid for by the ADA, and these concen-
trate on the diversification and modernization of 
small-scale agriculture, which often entails the 
setting up of cooperatives and farm associations. 
These belong to a category of projects labelled 
by the ADA as “solidarity agriculture”, and they 
often obtain the support of international devel-
opment agencies, Belgian cooperation being 
their first supporter.
In a word, while Pillar I targets the capital-
ist sector and the spilling over of its economic 
dynamism to the subsistence sector, Pillar II ac-
tions are oriented toward the traditional sector.
4. Methodology
4.1.  Case studies and theoretical reflections
In the following section, we look at a Span-
ish3 company that is connected to international 
markets, that uses water efficiently, and that is 
introducing capital-intense techniques along 
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with certain industrial activities into its produc-
tion chain. It is a case that matches the defining 
features of the Lewis’ capitalist sector – compar-
atively productive, creating jobs, offering high 
wages and therefore increasing income – as well 
as those of companies targeted in the GMP. It is 
therefore a paradigmatic case for new agricultur-
al investments fostered by the GMP.
As explained by Flyvbjerg (2006), paradig-
matic case studies have a prototypical value, 
meaning they help to better understand a pro-
totype or, in Weberian terms, an ideal type. As 
argued by Venesson (2008), case studies tend to 
focus on theoretical categories rather than spe-
cific bodies of evidence.
Theory-building case studies represent a qual-
itative research technique often used in social 
sciences (Levi, 2008; Venesson, 2008; Bengts-
son and Hertting, 2013). In the field of transna-
tional company studies, Rugraff, Sánchez-An-
cochea and Sumner (2009) make a strong case 
for the use of single-unit research to explore the-
ories on the developmental effects of TNCs. In 
more general terms, case studies are often used 
to improve understanding of the behaviour of 
companies. Eisenhardt (1989) argues that such 
case studies must be evaluated as part of the pro-
cess of inducting theory, rather than as hypothe-
sis-testing research. 
The case of capitalist agriculture described in 
this document is used to reflect on the difficulties 
of reducing the gap between the modern/capi-
talist and traditional/subsistence sectors. In other 
words, it does not provide general evidence on 
the capitalist agricultural sector in Morocco, nor 
does it measure the actual and overall perfor-
mance of the GMP. 
4.2. Why not a quantitative analysis on  the 
impact of the GMP?
In addition to reviewing the theory that un-
derlies the GMP, it would be relevant to test 
the development gap between Spain and Morocco, separated by a strait of only 14 km, is among the broadest gaps 
between bordering countries in the world.
4 These questionnaires were aimed at collecting additional information (on around 50 variables), as they were orig-
inally conceived in the framework of a larger research project on the effects of FDI on development in North Africa. 
That research project was implemented between 2011 and 2013. 
whether the plan has produced expected results 
in coping with dualism at a country scale. Doing 
so would demand a different methodological ap-
proach (for instance, a large-N analysis testing 
the correlation between the actual implemen-
tation of GMP Pillar I and the evolution of the 
agricultural subsistence sector). Unfortunately, 
a quantitative test of theories on Moroccan ag-
riculture is not possible with the available data. 
Neither do the Moroccan statistical services dis-
aggregate data for this sector, as they have done 
for data on the industrial sector; nor does the ag-
ricultural agency (ADA) disclose information on 
its land-leasing operations. 
Despite the intentions of the paper, this limita-
tion inevitably leads to the question of whether 
the conclusions reached around this particular 
case can be generalized to other investments fa-
cilitated by the GMP. Conclusions from a single 
case study are sometimes generalized to a larger 
number, according to Bengtsson and Hertting 
(2013), by means of “rationalistic generaliza-
tion”. This logic of inference relies on expec-
tations about similar mechanisms operating in 
similar contexts. Once our research question 
on the underlying theory of the GMP has been 
answered, we will briefly address the question 
of the real effects of the GMP on duality at the 
sector level.
4.3.  Data and techniques
Both qualitative and quantitative information 
on labour, production, wages, and sales for this 
investment project have been collected on the 
basis of a questionnaire (Annex A) and a guide 
for providing information (Annex B)4. The pro-
cess for data collection was as follows: (I) an ini-
tial meeting with an executive from the company 
in the field, in order to gather general informa-
tion on the transnational company (activity sec-
tor, history of the company in the country, etc.); 
(II) submission of both the questionnaire and the 
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guide to qualitative information; (III) a second 
(phone) interview in order to resolve doubts and 
questions around the provision of data; and (IV) 
complementary interviews with other actors in 
the agricultural sector5. Fieldwork was conduct-
ed between January and March of 2013. 
5. A foreign-owned almond farm in the frame-
work of Pillar II
As mentioned above, the attraction of mod-
ern investment to the agricultural sector (under 
Pillar I) is implemented through international 
tenders, meaning that such investments appear 
in the form of foreign direct investment (FDI). 
Therefore, the dynamics of dualism might be 
different from those expected in a closed econo-
my: Lewis anticipated the possibility of a short-
cut in the virtuous circle of dualism and develop-
ment if this were to occur in an open economy. 
In such a case, where an economy is importing 
capital from abroad, Lewis (1954) foresaw the 
formation of enclaves (very much in line with 
the structuralist postulate).
Indeed, both the Lewisian and structuralist 
traditions warn of the appearance of enclaves, 
historically significant in the development chal-
lenges of developing countries. Moreover, the 
capitalist sector might be linked to global pro-
duction or distribution chains that are discon-
nected from the local economy, and high levels 
of productivity might be associated with the dis-
play of weak labour intensity. In the latter case, 
the capacity of the capitalist sector to connect 
with the traditional economy through labour 
transfer would therefore be limited.
Morocco has been fairly successful in attract-
ing FDI. During the 2011-2015 period, FDI in-
flows amounted to 2.9% of the country’s GDP 
– a record figure nearly twice that of the over-
all region (1.6%), according to UNCTAD data. 
5 These included: representatives of the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries; staff of the Belgian and Spanish 
cooperation agencies, providing financial support to the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries and the Agency of Ag-
ricultural Development in the implementation of the Green Morocco Plan; the Moroccan agency AMDI, responsible 
for inward investment attraction; as well as another Spanish company with features similar to the investment under 
analysis but operating in a different subsector and region.
6 “Spanish almond farmers warn of market speculation”, in Foodnews Agribusiness, October 2015: https://www.
agra-net.com/agra/foodnews/dfn/nuts/almonds/spanish-almond-farmers-warn-of-market-speculation-496602.htm; 
“Almond Prices Surge as Sales Boom Collides With Drought”, Bloomberg, July 2015. 
However, according to data from the Office des 
Changes, the lion’s share of such investment has 
been channelled to the industrial and real estate 
sectors (55% of average inflows for the 2011-
2015 period). The agricultural sector has mean-
while attracted less than 0.5% of total FDI, and 
the forestry subsector just slightly over 4 million 
dirhams annually for the 2011-2015 period (or 
less than 2% of total FDI inflows to the agricul-
tural sector).
Among FDI inflows to the forestry sector 
are those of Moroccan Almond International 
S.A.R.L., a greenfield investment by a Span-
ish agro-food group producing various dessert 
products, mainly for the Spanish market and its 
Christmas season. The group also maintains its 
own almond orchards in southern Spain, allow-
ing it to lessen exclusive dependence on the in-
ternational market, which is highly speculative6. 
During the time when Moroccan authorities 
were seeking to attract Spanish farming com-
panies by means of international tenders for the 
rental of state-owned properties, this group opted 
to seize the opportunity and enlarge its almond 
production in a country with physical conditions 
similar to those of southern Spain. The produc-
tion output of the Moroccan farm was meant to 
target either European Union markets or to re-
inforce the supply chain of the group. In either 
case, it was to be an export-oriented investment.
To launch this enterprise, the company rented 
a farm of 350 hectares (300 of which are ded-
icated to almond trees), and it invested € 2.5 
million in related assets: select new trees; an ir-
rigation system; diverse agricultural equipment; 
and an almond processing line for the automatic 
grading, cracking, separating, and peeling of the 
product. Previously, the company had performed 
a market analysis and an assessment of product 
feasibility, mainly focused on land quality and 
water availability. That study concluded that 
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conditions in Morocco were as favourable as 
those in California or Spain, and it recommend-
ed the marcona almond as the most suitable va-
riety for such conditions.
The most remarkable investment feature, in 
terms of its development potential, appeared to 
be the technological content of the production 
process, which was likely to favour productivi-
ty and certain employment effects, including an 
increase in qualified jobs. As explained in Ta-
ble 2, the analysed investment (in line with the 
performance of Spanish farms) could produce 
€ 1,044 per hectare, while the typical ratio for 
traditional farms was just € 176 per hectare, ac-
cording to information gathered by the company 
from the local producers. Here, what may be the 
first manifestation of the dualistic gap within 
the agriculture sector becomes evident: the fact 
that land productivity in this investment project 
is 5.93 times higher than in the traditional (or 
subsistence) sector.
The differences between these two means of 
production derive from the selection of plant 
types, irrigation, pruning techniques, and the 
processing line, as described above. 
In summary, where an individual Moroccan 
farmer manages a farm of 5 hectares and uses 
0.2 employees per hectare (essentially allowing 
the almond trees to grow naturally, without ir-
rigation or careful pruning), a Spanish farmer 
would obtain productivity in terms of employ-
ment that is 10 times higher. This highlights an-
other relevant feature of the investment in terms 
of the capitalist/subsistence classification: a cap-
ital-intense new activity will very likely have a 
relatively higher impact on productivity than on 
job creation. 
As per Table 3, this activity is more likely 
to produce effects by means of its expenditure 
in the industrial sector (where 30% of running 
costs correspond to equipment) than in the la-
bour market (representing only 15% of running 
costs). However, all the machinery not availa-
ble from local markets was imported from the 
group’s suppliers in Spain, and purchases were 
mainly energy and water. In this sense, this al-
mond farm may be complying with the features 
described by Lewis in the open version of the 
dualistic model: the capitalist sector may be im-
porting capital from the very source to which it 
exports its products. If this is the case, the ca-
pacity for this sector to close the gap with the 
traditional sector will be limited.
Regarding labour conditions, the company 
recognized that most manpower was paid at the 
legal minimum salary (€ 2,535.60 per year, at 
that time), which was considered a positive ef-
fect given the informality of the sector and the 
relative value for an annual almond crop pro-
duced by an individual traditional farmer (€ 
880). However, this investment has not favoured 
qualified employment other than the manageri-
al position (an agricultural engineer), covered 
at that time by a Spanish expatriate. Still, this 
might comply with Lewis’ postulates, in the 
sense that the farm is contributing to an overall 
Table 2 - Productivity in different agriculture contexts.
Productive indicators 









Production area (hectares) 275,000 425,842 144,228
Grain production (tons) 732,580 53,590 21,700
Productivity (kilogram/hectare) 2,686 110 / 360 55 / 450
Producer price (euros/kilogram) 2.28 2.9 3
Production value (euros/hectare) 6,129 319 / 1,044 176 / 1,440
Average farm size (hectares) 35 6.3 5
Share of irrigated farms (%) 100% 95.5% 85%
Source: Moroccan Almonds International S.A.R.L.
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increase of wages. Even so, given its high land 
and labour productivity and its capital intensity, 
the investment does not appear to be a force for 
job creation.
At the time of our fieldwork, the almond trees 
had reached only 50% of their production capac-
ity, but the company’s turnover accounted for 8 
million dirhams (€ 720,000), which was con-
sidered a success by the company’s managers. 
Although the absolute running costs of the farm 
were not provided during the interviews, this 
statement of success is supported by the above 
information on running costs (mainly water and 
energy) and by a comparison between the initial 
investment (€ 2.5 million) and the company’s 
yearly turnover (€ 720,000-€ 1,440,000).
This added value, when shared with the rest of 
the economy by means of taxation, could con-
ceivably have diverse effects on public goods; 
but the tax system of Morocco, which awards 
agriculture with full exoneration from both di-
rect and indirect taxes, hinders such effects. A 
good share of the value is very likely repatriated 
to Spain, there being no quantitative or qualita-
tive limitation upon such repatriation in the Mo-
roccan legislation.
Finally, the expected results of the investors 
in terms of exports and international competi-
tiveness – which, ideally, also would have met 
the expectations of the GMP – were not fully 
reached. The Moroccan almond market is pro-
tected by strong tariffs, and the country still pre-
sents a negative balance. Thus, the investor has 
found it more profitable to orient its production 
toward local markets, thereby having an indirect 
impact on the commercial balance, via import 
substitution, but not on local prices, despite the 
introduction of higher productivity rates.
These factors reveal an interesting feature of 
this particular company and sector. Both the du-
alistic and structuralist approaches (along with 
the GMP) would have expected this almond 
farm to export its production; but in the end, 
it does not. Therefore in this case, this Spanish 
company is not fully complying with the ex-
pected profile of the capitalist sector in an open 
economy. 
5.1. Widening or closing the gap?
The Spanish almond company does essential-
ly comply with the features of foreign invest-
ment expected by the GMP, as well as with those 
of the capitalist sector in a dual economy, as de-
scribed in the academic literature. At this point, 
two questions arise. The first is whether the cap-
italist-subsistence gap is diminishing or increas-
ing, given that the company does not export its 
almond production and therefore does not fully 
comply with Lewis’ scenario, which predicts a 
widening gap. However, the company does com-
ply with two other features: the import of capital 
Table 3 - Comparing capitalist and subsistence almond farms.
Type of farm:




 Irrigated  Non-irrigated
 Industrial shelling  Manual shelling
Cost structure: 
- Labour costs 15% 90%
- Equipment depreciation 30% 0%
- Purchases 55% 10%
Farm size (hectares) 350 5
Employees per hectare 0.12 0.2
Productivity (euros/hectare) 1044 176
Productivity (euros/employee) 8,700 880
Source: Authors’ interviews.
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and the repatriation of benefits. Secondly, the 
role of the public sector (by means of the GMP) 
may also affect the widening or closing of the 
gap between the two sectors.
In theory, the inward orientation of the ana-
lysed investment may actually be a factor of 
convergence for the two sectors: as the company 
is not orienting its product to a global production 
or distribution chain, this internal orientation 
may be triggering other economic effects that 
could eventually contribute to closing the gap 
with the traditional sector. In practice, almonds 
being a standard product in Morocco already, the 
only expected effect would come via prices, and 
yet this is hindered by Moroccan tariffs protect-
ing the domestic market.
The almond farm could play a role in closing 
the gap were productivity gains and consequent 
wage increases to spill over into the traditional 
sector. If a traditional Moroccan farmer manag-
ing a 5 hectare farm is able to borrow and adopt 
Spanish farming techniques, he might eventual-
ly increase his production value from € 880 to 
as high as € 8,700. At the time of our visits to 
the site, the ADA and Spanish Cooperation in 
Morocco had already approached the investing 
company and proposed that it become leader of 
an aggregation project. 
As explained above, aggregation within the 
GMP does not mean a physical aggregation of 
lands, but an association of different players with-
in a particular agro-food value chain, in which 
a high-performing actor takes a leading role in 
terms of productivity and commercialization. This 
would very likely favour technological spill-overs 
to the subsistence sector. However, according to 
the interviews, the foreign players have found it 
difficult to cooperate with the subsistence sector 
given the fragmentation of local almond farmers 
and their lack of managerial capacities. The com-
pany’s proposal in this respect was first to set up 
a cooperative, or else another entity reinforcing 
the traditional sector’s capacities, then to chan-
nel both technical and commercial cooperation 
with modern companies. In this sense,Vitry et al. 
(2015) have collected evidence indicating that im-
plementation of the GMP has been facing difficul-
ties related to the farmers’ lack of organizational 
knowledge and their reluctance to cooperate.
In summary, this appears to be a successful 
case of FDI attraction under the first pillar of 
the Green Morocco Plan, as it has introduced a 
competitive new farm into the country. It has in-
creased private investment for high added-value 
production that is potentially competitive in in-
ternational markets. 
Moreover, from a wider development perspec-
tive, this investment’s effects are also limited in 
terms of its contribution to public goods (due to 
tax exonerations meant to assist small farmers), 
or in terms of its ability to inject dynamism into 
the local industrial sector. Because tariffs hinder 
any positive effect on prices, Moroccan industry 
has not captured the new demand for industrial 
equipment.
6. Conclusions
The GMP may be facing limitations on coping 
with the dualistic nature of Morocco’s agricul-
tural sector due to the terms under which Pillar 
I is implemented: (1) through international ten-
ders, leading to FDI inflows; and (2) without the 
necessary conditions for extending moderniza-
tion to the local traditional sector. Although this 
single case may not represent the whole agricul-
tural sector, it seems plausible that other foreign 
investments may prove unable to produce the 
development outcomes expected by the GMP, 
for several reasons. 
First, this agricultural exploitation is capi-
tal-intense rather than labour-intense (in rela-
tion to Moroccan farms in general), and it does 
not seem an adequate means to achieve the 
GMP’s goals in terms of job creation. While it 
is true that investments in other products might 
involve different technologies, and be relatively 
more demanding in terms of manpower, mech-
anization remains an explicit goal of the GMP 
in line with its concerns over international com-
petitiveness. 
Second, technological spill-overs from foreign 
companies are not automatic but demand that 
linkages be forged between the foreign company 
and local actors (suppliers, partners, etc.). To fa-
vour such linkages, the aggregation program of 
the GMP and, in general terms, the facilitating 
role of the ADA seem to be useful policy tools. 
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Third, any profits achieved in protected markets 
by modern farms with limited manpower, low 
rental costs, and full tax exoneration will favour 
the investor exclusively. It is remarkable that the 
GMP has not taken consideration of such key 
economic policy tools as taxes, wages, tariffs, or 
subsidized land rental in modern agriculture. In 
short, the GMP may in this regard be subsidizing 
foreign investors, rather than local agricultural 
businesses in the subsistence sector, which may 
be defeating the purpose of the plan.
This study has further raised a series of ques-
tions in terms of public policy. As per the over-
all logic of the GMP, the attraction of foreign 
players with productivity rates 10 times higher 
than local farmers may be seen as a necessary 
condition to finding leaders for the reorganiza-
tion of value chains and the upgrading of local 
farm productivity. However, this case (as well 
as previous research by Vitry et al., 2015) points 
out that such reorganization at the sector scale 
demands a certain pre-existing organizational 
structure among local farmers. Thus the GMP 
might consider a re-evaluation of how public 
support to agricultural activities in the first pillar 
may be subject to synergies vis-à-vis the second 
pillar. For instance, tax exonerations could be 
limited to the second pillar only, or to aggrega-
tion projects, while taxes paid by the perform-
ing capitalist sector could, for example, fund 
policies supporting technological upgrades in 
the subsistence sector. In any case, the next ver-
sion of the Green Morocco Plan should perform 
a cost/benefit analysis of Pillar I by comparing 
the opportunity costs of deals made with foreign 
investors to development effects such as labour 
creation, local purchasing, and technological 
spill-overs.
From a more academic point of view, this case 
study reveals the difficulty in converging the 
traditional and modern sectors within an open 
economy; as pointed out by structuralists and by 
Lewis in the case of open economies, the vibrant 
innovative sector produces basic goods and im-
ports capital goods, but may develop into an en-
clave. Thus, its results in terms of convergence 
and development are in line with those forward-
ed by the academic literature: the enterprise is 
not drawing labour from the traditional farms, 
technology is not spilling over to the poorest ru-
ral areas of production, and there is no tendency 
toward increased labour productivity in the sub-
sistence sector.
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Annex A
Projet de recherche: 
“Investissement étranger et développement - 
Opportunités pour les pays d’Afrique du Nord”
Enquête aux entreprises
1 (A4). Quel est votre chiffre d’affaires du dernier 
exercice fiscal?
 
2 (A5). Quel est votre share dans le marché ?
 
3 (A6).  Quelle est la ratio investissement / chiffre 







4 (B1).  Quel pourcentage représentent-ils les appro-
visionnement sur votre chiffre d’affaires ?
 
  (B2).  Quels sont vos approvisionnements princi-
paux :
 Produit 1 
 Produit 2 
 Produit 3 
 Produit 4 
 Produit 5 
5 (B3). Sont-ils locaux ? 
 Produit 1 Oui  Non 
 Produit 2 Oui  Non 
 Produit 3 Oui  Non 
 Produit 4 Oui  Non 
 Produit 5 Oui  Non 
6 (B4). Parce que vous n’avez pas le choix ?
 Produit 1  Oui  Non 
 Produit 2  Oui  Non 
 Produit 3  Oui  Non 
 Produit 4  Oui  Non 
 Produit 5  Oui  Non 
 Commentaires 
7 (C1). Importez-vous des produits de l’extérieur ?
 Oui  Non 
 Lesquels? 
8 (C2).  Quel pourcentage représentent les importa-
tions en relation avec vous achats totaux ?
 
9 (C3).  Dans votre cas, quels sont les pays d’impor-
tation ?
 Pays 1 
 Pays 2 
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 Pays 3 
 Pays 4 
 Pays 5 
10 (C4).  Comment distribuez-vous vos ventes à l’in-
térieur et à l’extérieur du pays ?
 Pourcentage des ventes….  
 …á l’intérieur du pays    %
 …à l’extérieur du pays    %
11 (C5).  Dans votre cas, quels son les pays d’expor-
tation ? 
 
12 (C6).  De vos lignes de financement, existe-t-il 
une partie d’endettement extérieur ? Quelle 
pourcentage représente-t-elle du finance-
ment total ? 
 Oui  Non 
 Part (%) 
13 (C7).  Rapatriez-vous vos bénéfices au pays 
d’origine de l’investissement ou dans un 
autre pays ? 
 Oui  Non 
 Part (%) 
14 (D1).  Faites une évaluation de la compétitivité du 
secteur avant l’initiation de vos activités
 0 (nulle) - 5 (très élevée) 
15 (G1).  Combien de travailleurs a votre entreprise / 
projet d’investissement ?
 
16 (G2). Catégories professionnelles ? 
 Titre catégorie 1 
 Titre catégorie 2 
 Titre catégorie 3 
 Titre catégorie 4 
 Titre catégorie 5 
17 (G3). Salaire moyen ?
 Catégorie 1 
 Catégorie 2 
 Catégorie 3 
 Catégorie 4 
 Catégorie 5 
18 (G4).  Évaluation de la législation: favorise-t-elle 
l’emploi et la formation de personnel local ? 
 0 (mauvaise) - 5 (excellente) 
 
19 (G5).  Évaluation de la qualification du capital hu-
main pour votre activité productive. 
 0 (mauvaise) - 5 (excellente)
 
20 (G7).  Existent-il d’autres demandes d’emploi sur 
vos ressources humaines ? Évaluez la pres-
sion de la demande sur vos employés. 
 0 (base) - 5 (très haute)
 
21 (H6).  Quelle évaluation faites vous du différentiel 
en technologies propres par rapport à vos 
concurrents ? (procès de production, biens 
d’équipes, etc.) ?
 0 (nul) - 5 (élevé)
 
22 (H8).  Quels impôts, taux publiques ou d’autres 
prélèvements doit payer votre entreprise ? 





 Part des ventes totales (%)
 
23 (H9).  Selon votre expérience personnelle, avez-
vous détecté des problèmes de corruption ?
 0 (aucun) - 5 (beaucoup)
 
24 (H11).  Quelle évaluation faites vous des infra-
structures locales pour la réalisation de 
votre activité productive ?
 0 (mauvaise) - 5 (excellente)
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Annex B
Projet de recherche: “Investissement étranger et développement - Opportunités pour les pays 
d’Afrique du Nord”
Plan de l’entretien
A Activité et création de l’entreprise
A1 Quel est l’objet de votre activité productive?
A2 Dans quel secteur et sous-secteur productif se trouve votre activité économique?
A3 Existait-il des produits / services similaires aux vôtres avant votre début d’activité?
A7 L’entreprise est-elle de nouvelle création ou le résultat d’une fusion ou d’une acquisition?
A8 Qui sont vos clients?
A9 Avez vous observé dans vos marchés de vente de nouvelles entrées ou investissements?
B Fournisseurs
B5 Il y a t’il une législation ou obligation d’achats locaux?
B6 Avez-vous observé de nouvelles entrées ou de nouveaux investissements dans votre chaine de fournisseurs?
B7 Avez-vous observé la création de nouveaux emplois dans votre chaine de fournisseurs?
C Insertion extérieure
C8 De quelle manière facilite ou difficulté la législation vos exportations et vos importations?
D Concurrence du marché
D2 Quelle est votre principale concurrence (numéro de compagnies, taille, noms…)?
D3 Quelle a été la réaction de votre concurrence à votre entrée / croissance dans le secteur / marché? Par exemple, observez-vous un effet imitation ?
D4 Avez-vous observé de nouvelles entrées/ investissements entre vos concurrents?
E Intensité / transfert technologique
E1 Quelle est votre évaluation du différentiel technologique para rapport à vos concurrents (procès productif, biens d’équipes, etc.)?
E2 Quelles sont les exigences technologiques de votre entreprise sur les fournisseurs et comment sont-elles répondus par vos fournisseurs locaux?
E3 Quel est le rôle de votre entreprise avec les améliorations technologiques dans votre chaine de fournisseurs?
G Travail
G6 Avez-vous une politique de formation officielle ou informelle? Décrivez-la
G8 Avez-vous besoin d’embaucher du personnel étranger? Quelles son les avantages et les inconvénients par rapport aux employés locaux?
G9 Avec quels critères votre entreprise décide-t-elle les rémunérations? Avez-vous formalisé ces critères?
H Fiscalité, communauté et environnement
H1 Quelles organisations de la société civile ont contacté votre entreprise?
H2 Avez-vous une politique de relations avec la communauté où vous opérez (voisins, autorités locales, uni-versités, etc.)? Décrivez-la
H3 Comment collabore votre entreprise avec l’environnement? Avez-vous adopté un compromis formel par écrit en matière environnementale?
H4 Quelles lois environnementales ont eu un impact sur les opérations de votre entreprise?
H5 Quelles investissements ont été réalisés par votre entreprise en technologies propres?
H7 Avez-vous transférés vos technologies propres à des fournisseurs, clients ou concurrents? Décrivez la si-tuation.
H10 Faites-vous une ou plusieurs contributions volontaires financières a la communauté?
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